

External Secure Storage Using the PUF

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Summary

To store data in non-volatile memory (NVM) using a Zynq[®] UltraScale+™ device, data must be stored externally and should be encrypted if it is confidential. All Zynq UltraScale+ devices have a built-in physically unclonable function (PUF), which can generate a cryptographically strong, device-unique encryption key that can be used in combination with the built-in advanced encryption standard (AES) cryptographic core. This key cannot be read by a user, allowing for a heightened level of key security. Only if a Zynq UltraScale+ device is provisioned to store the PUF configuration information in eFUSEs and if Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) Authentication is registered and enabled in eFUSEs, then the PUF's device-unique encryption key can be used to encrypt and decrypt user data, which can then be stored and read from external non-volatile memory.

Download the reference design files for this application note from the Xilinx® website. For detailed information about the design files, see Reference Design.

Introduction

The PUF takes advantage of silicon variations unique to Zynq UltraScale+ devices to generate a device-unique encryption key that cannot be read by anyone, including the user. Along with generating a unique encryption key, the PUF also generates the required helper data so that the PUF can exactly regenerate the encryption key later. The details of the PUF are described in the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC: Technical Reference Manual (UG1085) [Ref 1]. Normally, the PUF's encryption key, referred to as the Key Encryption Key (KEK), is used for encrypting a user's plain-text red key so that a user's red key can be stored encrypted in black key form in either eFUSES or the boot header. The black encryption key is then decrypted using the PUF's KEK to generate the red key, which in turn is used for decrypting the boot information during secure boot. This use of the PUF is shown in Figure 1.






Figure 1: Encrypting and Decrypting the Device Key Using PUF

When the PUF is registered in eFUSEs and RSA authentication is enabled in eFUSEs, documented in *Programming BBRAM and eFUSEs* (XAPP1319) [Ref 2], the PUF's device-unique encryption key can be used to encrypt and decrypt any user data. This encrypted data can then be stored externally to the Zynq UltraScale+ device, which is the focus of this application note. The RSA authentication settings cannot be stored in the boot header when using the PUF to encrypt and decrypt user data.



IMPORTANT: When the RSA_ENABLE eFUSEs are programmed, boot header authentication is no longer permitted.

The process of using the PUF to encrypt user data is shown in Figure 2 and works as follows: a user generates data that must be encrypted and appends an optional ID. This optional ID can be used to validate that the correct version of data that is being used, such as when the data consists of encryption key information or configuration data, and is useful in preventing replay attacks. Even though the ID is optional, Xilinx highly recommends using it to ensure a more secure system. The optional ID enables key/data revocation as the user data packet can be revoked by burning one of the 256-bit user eFUSEs. Each of the 256-bit user eFUSEs can be mapped to 256 different 8-bit user IDs. Keep in mind that user eFUSEs are a shared resource as the fuses could be used for Enhanced Key Revocation software, a tamper log (see *Developing Tamper-Resistant Designs with Zyng UltraScale+ Devices* (XAPP1323) [Ref 3]), or any other user function.

Next, the PUF is enabled to regenerate the PUF's device-unique encryption key, which is loaded into the AES cryptographic core to encrypt the data. Xilinx recommends minimizing the use of the PUF's key by keeping the user data small or implementing an advanced key-rolling



architecture where the PUF's device-unique key is only used to encrypt the first portion of a larger sized data, thereby minimizing its exposure. This helps to avoid differential power analysis (DPA) attacks. After the encrypted data is written to external memory, the data is read back and decrypted to verify the process using the GCM authentication tag. If the data is authenticated, the user selected ID is safe to use. Conversely, if the data verification fails, a revocation penalty can take place, such as burning an associated user eFUSE.





Figure 2: Normal Encryption Process Using PUF

Decrypting external data using the PUF is shown in Figure 3 and works as follows: the encrypted data packet is read from the external memory location followed by regeneration of the PUF decryption key. The data is then decrypted and authenticated via the GCM tag. If authentication passes and if the ID from the decrypted data has not been revoked in user eFUSEs, then the data is valid and can be used. Conversely, if the GCM tag authentication fails, then a penalty can be invoked and the decryption process could be stopped to avoid side channel attacks such as DPA. Furthermore, if the decryption process authenticates but the data's ID has been revoked in user eFUSEs, the data is invalid and should not be used.



IMPORTANT: The PUF KEK isn't a FIPS legal key for storing data outside a cryptographic boundary. However, you can create a FIPS-legal KEK, encrypt the FIPS-legal KEK with the PUF KEK, store the encrypted FIPS-legal KEK in eFUSEs, and subsequently use the FIPS-legal KEK to store data outside the cryptographic boundary.





Hardware and Software Requirements

The hardware and software requirements for the reference systems are as follows:

- ZCU102 Evaluation Board
- AC power adapter (12 VDC)
- USB type-A to USB mini-B cable x2
- Optional Platform JTAG hardware and associated cables
- Secure Digital (SD) card formatted using the FAT file system
- Xilinx Software Development Kit (SDK) 2018.1
- Required design files, which can be downloaded here.



IMPORTANT: Programming any of the noted eFUSE settings preclude Xilinx test access. Consequently, Xilinx may not accept return material authorization (RMA) requests.



Create a New Embedded Project for the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC

Perform the following steps to create a new embedded project for the Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC. A brief description is covered in this section. Step-by-step instructions can be found in Appendix A. For detailed elaboration on each step, refer to the *UltraScale+ MPSoC: Embedded Design Tutorial* (UG1209) [Ref 4] for further details.

- 1. Open up Vivado[®] Design Suite and create the hardware design required for the Zynq UltraScale+ ZCU102 Evaluation Board. The PL is not required for this lab so all the PS-PL interfaces are disabled and no bitstream is exported.
- 2. Export the hardware and launch Xilinx SDK from within the Vivado Design Suite.
- 3. Create a first stage boot loader project called **FSBL** and its associated Board Support Package named **A53_BSP** running on the ARM Cortex-A53 processor.
- 4. Build the **FSBL** project by right-clicking on the project and select **Build Project**. This may have already been completed if the **Build Automatically** setting is enabled in Xilinx SDK.
- 5. Create a **HelloWorld** project to verify the hardware and software setup before proceeding.

Key Generation

Key generation is covered in detail in the *UltraScale+ MPSoC: Embedded Design Tutorial* (UG1209) [Ref 4] so only a summary pertaining to this application note is documented here.

AES Key Generation

Create a new directory in Xilinx SDK's workspace root directory called Keys. The SDK root directory can be found the same level as the HelloWorld folder. Generate a device key and its associated IV, an operational key, and one partition block key and its associated IV. Combine these keys and IVs into a file named multiple_keys.nky. Alternatively, copy the Keys folder found in the reference design documents to use for this lab or, if desired, use them as a template and insert your own key and IV values.

```
Device zcu9eg;
Key 0 0123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123456789
```

Encrypting the boot image is not required to use the PUF for encrypting user data. However, Xilinx highly recommends doing so, which is used throughout this application note.



IMPORTANT: Be sure to use your own AES keys and associated IVs for operational devices. The keys provided in this lab are for demonstration purposes and are not cryptographically strong.





RSA Asymmetric Key Generation

For this application note, generate a pair of RSA keys called **psk0.pem** and **ssk0.pem**. Alternatively, these keys are provided in the design documents in the Keys folder. RSA authentication is required to use the PUF for encrypting and decrypting user data. While this application note does not require the use of a secondary key set, Xilinx highly recommends doing so in an operational application.



IMPORTANT: Be sure to use your own RSA key pairs in an operational device. The keys provided in this lab are for demonstration purposes and are not cryptographically strong.

Generate SHA3 of Public RSA Asymmetric Key

Generate the associated SHA3 hash of the RSA PPK and name the output file **sha3.txt**. Alternatively, this hash can be found in the design documents in the Keys folder.

PUF eFUSE Configuration



IMPORTANT: THESE INSTRUCTIONS MODIFY THE EFUSES ON THE ZCU102 DEVELOPMENT BOARD AND MAY LIMIT FUTURE USE OF THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD FOR NON-SECURE TESTING AND DEBUGGING!



IMPORTANT: Programming any of the noted eFUSE settings preclude Xilinx test access. Consequently, Xilinx might not accept return material authorization (RMA) requests.

PUF eFUSE Settings

PUF registration is covered in detail in *Using the PUF* in the *UltraScale+ MPSoC: Embedded Design Tutorial* (UG1209) [Ref 4] so only a summary pertaining to this application note is documented here.

- 1. Right-click the A53_BSP project and click Board Support Package Settings.
- 2. Click Overview.
- 3. In the **Supported Libraries**, select **xilsecure** and **xilskey**.
- 4. Click **OK** to close the window.
- 5. Right-click the **A53_BSP** project and click **Re-generate BSP Sources**.
- 6. Expand the A53_BSP project and double-click the system.mss file to open it.
- 7. Scroll to the bottom of the file and click **Import Examples** for the **xilskey** library.
- 8. Check the **xilskey_puf_registration** example and click **OK**. This adds the associated project to your workspace.





- Open the xilskey_puf_registration.h file in the src folder under
 A53_BSP_xilskey_puf_registration_1 in the Project Explorer tab.
- 10. Change the definition of **XSK_PUF_INFO_ON_UART** to **TRUE**. This setting is extremely important to verify the PUF registration completed successfully.
- 11. Ensure the definition of **XSK_PUF_PROGRAM_EFUSE** is set to **TRUE**.
- 12. Change the definition of XSK_PUF_PROGRAM_SECUREBITS to TRUE.
- 13. Change the definition of **XSK PUF SYN WRLK** to **TRUE**.
- 14. Set the XSK_PUF_AES_KEY to the Key 0 value in the aes_key.nky file.
- 15. Set the **XSK_PUF_IV** to a value that is user choice. This IV is not related to the IV created in **aes_key.nky** and can be any user generated value. This IV is used by encryption when encrypting the red key with the PUF's KEK.
- 16. Create a file named **puf_iv.txt** with the ASCII-HEX string of the PUF IV used in **XSK_PUF_IV** as this is needed during boot. Alternatively, use the one provided in the design documents in the Keys folder.
- 17. Verify all the required changes are made before continuing as shown in Figure 4. The **xilskey_puf_registration.h** file with the example keys, shown in Figure 4, is included in the reference design in the puf_registration folder.




Figure 4: PUF Registration File Required for eFUSE



PUF Registration into eFUSEs

To register the PUF into the eFuse, perform the following steps:

- 1. Right-click the A53_BSP project and click Board Support Package Settings.
- 2. In the **Board Support Package Settings** window, expand the Overview tree, then click **standalone** as shown in Figure 5.




Figure 5: Setting Up the UART Output Using the BSP Settings

- 3. Ensure the **stdin** and **stdout** functions are mapped to psu uart 0 and click **OK**.
- 4. In Xilinx SDK, right-click **A53_BSP_xilskey_puf_registration_1** and select **Build Project**. This may have already been completed if your SDK environment is set up to build automatically.
- 5. Turn power off to the ZCU102 board.
- 6. Connect either the USB JTAG connector J2 to the ZCU102 development board and then a computer or connect the Platform JTAG to the ZCU102 and the associated hardware to a computer.
- 7. Connect a USB cable from the USB Serial port connector J83 on the ZCU102 board to a computer and note which COM port was enumerated with the Silicon Labs Quad CP2108 USB to UART Bridge: Interface 0.



- 8. Open a terminal program such as PuTTY or Tera Term and connect to the COM port listed above at 115,200 baud. Enable terminal logging and select a file name and location.
- 9. On the ZCU102 development board, set the dip switch SW6 to configure the board for JTAG boot mode as shown in Figure 6.




Figure 6: ZCU102 JTAG Boot Mode Switch

10. Power on the ZCU102 board using switch SW1.



11. Right-click A53_BSP_xilskey_puf_registration_1 > Run As > Launch on Hardware (System Debugger) as shown in Figure 7.




Figure 7: Running the PUF Registration on the ZCU102 Board



The PUF registration application starts running and outputs information to the terminal as shown in Figure 8 and Figure 9. An example log of the PUF registration is included in the design files in the Logs folder called **puf_registration_log.log**.




Figure 8: Terminal Output Registering PUF to eFUSEs - 1



```
25 App: Raw Data[16]:02B00000
26 App: Raw Data[17]:02F00000
27 App: Raw Data[18]:02800000
28 App: Raw Data[19]:02A00000
29 App: Raw Data[20]:02A00000
30 App: Raw Data[21]:02900000
31 App: Raw Data[22]:02C00000
32 App: Raw Data[23]:02900000
33 App: Raw Data[24]:02A00000
34 App: Raw Data[25]:02B00000
35 App: Raw Data[26]:02D00000
36 App: Raw Data[27]:02C00000
37 App: Raw Data[28]:02C00000
38 App: Raw Data[29]:02C00000
39 App: Raw Data[30]:02800000
40 App: Raw Data[31]:02800000
41 App: Raw Data[32]:02800000
42 App: Raw Data[33]:02C00000
43 App: Raw Data[34]:02B00000
44 App: Raw Data[35]:00000000
45 App: Debug 2 result end!
46 App: Red key - 0123456789012345678901234567890123456789012345678901234567890123
47 App: Black key IV - 012345678901234567890123
48 App: DCache disabled
49 App: DMA config
50 App: DMA config initialize
51 App: AES initialize
52 App: AES encryption
   App: Black key - 45708B9872F7381850F81A5152EF349E35A7F906FA359D542E4E5ED51F67E82B
 App: Programming eFUSE
 5 App:Formatted syndrome data start!!!
  0BED5B2E1B6A265677D4DA923D4ACBB4273967147FD0EC2D9F4FB6A7C8D56AF0693664380AD697D69A6B28
  104433DD066F5E452452975CE373F0F835C1E01169E9A073FF767755041AFF2989A9DB9BBB426225BCC2D9
   F80781F657202E37321E48ACBC51D58D97DAB7215FC003D977A25BBA9FBECB8DE92836958CCC60F1C64930
   A1BB5F690551FDE3620F7612C253866C9BC12DBE5A4AAF7C82F5BDA0FD93E69BFC9A9ACD2FED6E7A895806
   2BFF4A9D90260F8A2887E075A8B8A326D9302AE8CB1EE03DDDE00DE6E89E19AC94AE3F72128C82ABB44E69
   43F35035E6235ECAC826D6864DEFA437C96FF9F0FB219801560F421C0FDED8F72FD68AF396CCFEC60EC5B5
   2180A446865B0E403730F130BE6B4767162ECDF739542741E4E2EFD46FBBA687EF5408A61B1D682A08A3A6
  BEF3F0D4A779BE35483D25C8837E72058D2DB8D2EEF0A46098D618C1B9F923D02C6054778A45FDA6943350
  951D6F32501A1FC2920C4600897F9EFA6664989FA9CA7A75DB70222E7A99AEDDF9646B2A40DB895DE12B1E
  05CB81E630C1AC546ADEC0DA6CD84029072275612C41338F0BE06CC7252A474C84C20BA504C03B89406D3F
   66DFF7B500F2AB70BACB2B2F0E6D272E4A9B6D3A6201C4C6B28E750B89AFE3EA55F807144DE168DD786F09
   3A4788F71978FA3A1D433396658AB66FF52CFFBCAF42FE6C231EDE1B4DDE1882D3D300
    on:Formatted syndrome data End!!!
59 App: Syndrome write successful
60 App: Aux write successful
61 App: CHASH write successful
62 App: Black key writing is passed
  App; CRC caclculated on black key is = 572287EF
  App: Writing eFUSE PUF secure bits
66 Status:00000000
```

Figure 9: Terminal Output Registering PUF to eFUSEs - 2

- 12. Verify line 46 of the UART output is the Red Key that was configured in **XSK_PUF_AES_KEY** in **xilskey_puf_registration.h**.
- 13. Verify line 47 of the UART output is the Black Key IV that was configured in **XSK_PUF_IV** in **xilskey_puf_registration.h**.

Line 54 of the UART output is the Black Key generated by the AES encryption engine using the PUF as a KEK.



Line 55 shows that the Black Key was burned into eFUSEs.

Line 57 of the UART output is the required syndrome data that the PUF uses to regenerate its device-unique encryption key. It is the data that is being programmed into the eFUSEs.

Lines 65 shows that the PUF information has been burned into eFUSEs.

14. Power off the ZCU102 development board.

RSA eFUSE Configuration



IMPORTANT: THESE INSTRUCTIONS MODIFY THE EFUSES ON THE ZCU102 DEVELOPMENT BOARD AND MIGHT LIMIT FUTURE USE OF THE DEVELOPMENT BOARD FOR NON-SECURE TESTING AND DEBUGGING!



IMPORTANT: Programming any of the noted eFUSE settings preclude Xilinx test access. Consequently, Xilinx might not accept return material authorization (RMA) requests.

RSA eFUSE Settings

RSA eFUSE registration is covered in detail in *Programming eFUSEs for AES and RSA Cryptographic Functions* in the *Programming BBRAM and eFUSEs* [Ref 2], so only a summary pertaining to this application note is covered here.

- 1. Expand the A53_BSP project and double-click the system.mss file.
- 2. Scroll to the bottom of the file and click Import Examples for the **xilskey** library.
- 3. Check the **xilskey_efuseps_zynqmp_example** project and click **OK**. This adds the associated project to your workspace.
- 4. Open the xilskey_efuseps_zynqmp_input.h file in the src folder under
 A53 BSP xilskey efuseps zynqmp example 1 in the Project Explorer tab.
- 5. Change the definition of **XSK_EFUSEPS_RSA_ENABLE** to **TRUE**. This permanently forces the use of RSA authentication.
- 6. Change the definition of **XSK_EFUSEPS_PPKO_WR_LOCK** to **TRUE**. This prevents any modifications to the PPKO hash stored in eFUSEs.

The first set of settings are shown in Figure 10.



```
⊕ /**
  * Following is the define to select if the user wants to program
  * Secure control bits
  */
 #define XSK_EFUSEPS_AES_RD_LOCK
                                          FALSE
                                          FALSE
 #define XSK EFUSEPS AES WR LOCK
 #define XSK EFUSEPS ENC ONLY
                                          FALSE
 #define XSK_EFUSEPS_BBRAM_DISABLE
                                          FALSE
 #define XSK_EFUSEPS_ERR_DISABLE
                                          FALSE
 #define XSK EFUSEPS JTAG DISABLE
                                          FALSE
 #define XSK_EFUSEPS_DFT_DISABLE
                                          FALSE
 #define XSK EFUSEPS PROG GATE DISABLE
                                          FALSE
 #define XSK FFUSEPS SECURE LOCK
                                          FALSE
 #define XSK EFUSEPS RSA ENABLE
                                          TRUE
                                          TRUE
#define XSK_EFUSEPS_PPK0_WR_LOCK
 #define XSK EFUSEPS PPK0 INVLD
                                          FALSE
 #define XSK EFUSEPS PPK1 WR LOCK
                                          FALSE
 #define XSK EFUSEPS PPK1 INVLD
                                          FALSE
 #define XSK EFUSEPS LBIST EN
                                          FALSE
 #define XSK EFUSEPS LPD SC EN
                                          FALSE
 #define XSK EFUSEPS FPD SC EN
                                          FALSE
 #define XSK_EFUSEPS_PBR_B00T_ERR
                                          FALSE
```

Figure 10: Settings for RSA Authentication When Using eFUSEs - 1

- 7. In the next section of the configuration, change the definition of **XSK EFUSEPS WRITE PPKO HASH** to **TRUE**.
- 8. Change the definition of **XSK_EFUSEPS_PPKO_HASH** to the value stored in **sha3.txt** that was created by bootgen (or copied form the Keys directory) from the previous section.

The second set of settings are shown in Figure 11. These settings using the examples keys are included in the design files in the **xilskey_efuseps_zynqmp_input.h** file in the rsa_registration folder. The second RSA authentication key (PPK1) is not written for this application note but it can be done by changing the value of XSK EFUSEPS PPK1 WR LOCK and XSK EFUSEPS PPK1 HASH.



```
⊖ /**
  * Following is the define to select if the user wants to select AES key,
  * User Fuses, PPK0 Sha3 hash, PPK1 Sha3 hash and SPKID for Zyng MP
 /* For writing into eFuse */
 #define XSK FFUSEPS WRITE AFS KEY
                                        FALSE
 #define XSK EFUSEPS WRITE PPK0 HASH
                                        TRUE
 #define XSK_EFUSEPS_WRITE_PPK1_HASH
                                        FALSE
 #define XSK_EFUSEPS_WRITE_SPKID
                                        FALSE
 #define XSK_EFUSEPS_WRITE_USER0_FUSE
                                            FALSE
 #define XSK_EFUSEPS_WRITE_USER1_FUSE
                                            FALSE
 #define XSK_EFUSEPS_WRITE_USER2_FUSE
                                            FALSE
 #define XSK_EFUSEPS_WRITE_USER3_FUSE
                                            FALSE
 #define XSK_EFUSEPS_WRITE_USER4_FUSE
                                            FALSE
 #define XSK_EFUSEPS_WRITE_USER5_FUSE
                                            FALSE
 #define XSK_EFUSEPS_WRITE_USER6_FUSE
                                            FALSE
 #define XSK EFUSEPS WRITE USER7 FUSE
                                            FALSE
  * Following defines should be given in the form of hex string.
  * The length of AES_KEY string must be 64, PPK hash should be 96/64 based on
  * SHA3/SHA2 selction and and for USER FUSES, SPK ID must be 32.
                                #define XSK EFUSEPS AES KEY
 #define XSK FFUSEPS PPK0 IS SHA3
                                    TRUE
                                "38B29D670EECD2678105A9C51B203F50A0557B0614B33
 #define XSK EFUSEPS PPK0 HASH
```

Figure 11: Settings for RSA Authentication When Using eFUSEs - 2

Programming RSA eFUSEs

Program the RSA eFUSEs by performing the following steps:

- 1. Right-click A53_BSP project and click Board Support Package Settings.
- 2. In the **Board Support Package Settings** window, expand the **Overview** tree and then click **standalone**, as shown in Figure 5 in step 2 of PUF Registration into eFUSEs.
- 3. Ensure the **stdin** and **stdout** functions are still mapped to psu uart 0 and click **OK**.
- 4. In Xilinx SDK, right-click **A53_BSP_xilskey_efuseps_zynqmp_example_1** and select the **Build Project** option. This may have already been completed if your SDK environment is set up to build automatically.
- 5. Power off the ZCU102 board.
- Connect either the USB JTAG connector J2 to the ZCU102 development board and then a computer or connect the Platform JTAG to the ZCU102 and the associated hardware to a computer.
- 7. Connect a USB cable from the USB Serial port connector J83 on the ZCU102 board to a computer and make note of which COM port was enumerated with the *Silicon Labs Quad CP2108 USB to UART Bridge: Interface 0.*



- 8. Open a terminal program such as PuTTY or Tera Term and connect to the COM port listed above at 115,200 baud. Enable terminal logging and select a file name and location.
- 9. On the ZCU102 development board, set the dip switch SW6 to configure the board for JTAG boot mode as shown in Figure 6.
- 10. Power on the ZCU102 board using switch SW1.
- 11. Right-click A53_BSP_xilskey_efuseps_zynqmp_example_1 > Run As > Launch on Hardware (System Debugger).
- 12. The RSA eFUSE application starts running and outputs information to the terminal as shown in Figure 12. An example log of the writing the RSA eFUSEs is included in the design files in the *Logs* folder called **write_rsa_enable_log.log**.
- 13. Verify line 12 from the output terminal matches the SHA3 output that was generated and stored in the **sha3.txt** file.
- 14. Notice in line 18 from the terminal output that the "AES CRC check failed." This is because the Black Key was programmed during the PUF registration and the definition XSK_EFUSE_PS_WRITE_AES_KEY was set to false in the xilskey_efuseps_zynqmp_input.h file.

Line 31 confirms that RSA authentication is enabled and now required for use because this was burned into the eFUSEs.

Line 32 shows that the PPK0 eFUSE has been programed and the PPK0 SHA3 value cannot be changed.

15. Power off the ZCU102 development board.



```
DNA:40000000011497C34C412145keys read from cache
 2 User0 Fuse:00000000
 3 User1 Fuse:00000000
 4 User2 Fuse:00000000
 5 User3 Fuse:00000000
 6 User4 Fuse:00000000
 7 User5 Fuse:00000000
 8 User6 Fuse:000000000
9 User7 Fuse:00000000
   PPK0:38B29D670EECD2678105A9C51B203F50A0557B0614B3368E688469D31CBC867EE7C38D287E670D2E4
   FEF6D2D0EA9F7DE
16 Spkid: 00000000
   AES CRC checK is failed
   Secure and Control bits of eFuse:
   AES key CRC check is enabled
23 Programming AES key is enabled
24 All boots must be encrypted with eFuseAES key is disabled
25 BBRAM key is not disabled
26 Error output from PMU is enabled
27 Jtag is enabled
28 DFT is enabled
29 PROG_GATE feature is enabled
30 Reboot from JTAG is enabled
   RSA authentication is enabled
   Locks writing to PPK0 eFuse
33 Revoking PPK0 is disabled
34 writing to PPK1 efuses is not locked
35 Revoking PPK1 is disabled
36 LBIST is in disabled state
37 PBR boot error halt is disabled
   Zeroization of registers in Low Power Domain (LPD) during boot is disabled
39 Zeroization of registers in Full Power Domain (FPD) during boot is disabled
41 User control bits of eFuse:
42 Programming USER_0 fuses is enabled
43 Programming USER_1 fuses is enabled
44 Programming USER_2 fuses is enabled
45 Programming USER_3 fuses is enabled
46 Programming USER_4 fuses is enabled
47 Programming USER_5 fuses is enabled
48 Programming USER_6 fuses is enabled
49 Programming USER_7 fuses is enabled
50 Reserved 1 bits are not programmed on eFUSE
   Reserved 2 bits are programmmed on eFUSE
```

Figure 12: Terminal Output While Writing the RSA Settings to eFUSEs.

PUF Encryption and Decryption

PUF Encryption Decryption Demo Application

The PUF can now be used for encrypting and decrypting user data because the ZCU102 development board has been provisioned. Specifically, this section uses a reference design to show how to encrypt and decrypt user generated AES keys that are stored on an SD card.





IMPORTANT: Although the user generated encryption keys are being written to an external SD card, any type of user data can be encrypted/decrypted and written/read to any type of external non-volatile memory accessible by the Zyng UltraScale+ device.

To write to the SD card, modifications of the xparameters.h file located in A53_BSP > psu_cortexa53_0 > include is necessary. Comment out line 1406, #define FILE_SYSTEM_READ_ONLY, shown in Figure 13. This modification is required to make the SD card writable and readable.

```
/* Xilinx FAT File System Library (XilFFs) User Settings */
#define FILE_SYSTEM_INTERFACE_SD
//#define FILE_SYSTEM_READ_ONLY
#define FILE_SYSTEM_NUM_LOGIC_VOL 2
#define FILE_SYSTEM_USE_STRFUNC 0
#define FILE_SYSTEM_SET_FS_RPATH 0
#define FILE_SYSTEM_WORD_ACCESS
#define XPAR_XILPM_ENABLED
```

Figure 13: Modifying xparameters.h File to Make the SD Readable and Writable

- 2. In Xilinx SDK, click File > New > Application Project.
- 3. Type in **ExternalKeyStorage** in the Project name:
- 4. Select **Use default location**.
- 5. Leave the OS Platform as **standalone**.
- 6. Leave the Hardware Platform to the name of the hardware exported from Vivado Design Suite.
- 7. Leave the Processor as **psu_cortexa53_0**.
- 8. Leave the Language selected to **C**.
- 9. Leave the Compiler set at 64-bit.
- 10. Leave the Hypervisor Guest as **No**.
- 11. Change the Board Support Package to **Use existing: A53_BSP**.

These settings are shown in Figure 14.

- 12. Select Next.
- 13. Select **Empty Application**.
- 14. Click Finish.
- 15. Expand the src folder in **ExternalKeyStorage** of the Project explorer window.
- 16. Right-click **src** and select **Import**.
- 17. Expand General, select File System, and click Next.
- 18. Navigate to the ExternalKeyStorage/src folder in the reference design file directory and check all ".c" and ".h" files and then click **Finish** as shown in Figure 15.






Figure 14: Creating the ExternalKeyStorage Project in Xilinx SDK






Figure 15: Importing Files from the Reference Design into the ExternalKeyStorage Project

- 19. Create a new file called **ExternalKeyStorage.bif** in the ExternalKeyStorage folder. This file is also included with the design files and can be copied into the project folder but the paths must be updated to point to the correct folders. Manual creation of the BIF file is necessary to use the Black Key during boot as the Create Boot Image tool within Xilinx SDK does not currently support this feature. Future revisions of Xilinx SDK may support this feature.
- 20. Update the contents of the file to the contents shown in Figure 16 using the correct paths.



```
//arch = zynqmp; split = false; format = BIN
   the ROM image:
 3
      [pskfile] ../Keys/psk0.pem
      [sskfile] ../Keys/ssk0.pem
      [auth_params] spk_id = 0; ppk select = 0
      [aeskeyfile] ../Keys/multiple_keys.nky
      [keysrc encryption] efuse blk key
      [bh_key_iv] ../Keys/puf_iv.txt
      [fsbl_config] puf4kmode, shutter = 0x0100005E, opt_key
11
      [bootloader, destination_cpu=a53-0, encryption = aes, authentication = rsa]
12
         ../FSBL/Debug/FSBL.elf
13
      [encryption = aes, authentication = rsa, destination_cpu = a53-0]
14
         ./Debug/ExternalKeyStorage.elf
```

Figure 16: ExternalKeyStorage.bif File

- 21. Build the External KeyStorage project in Xilinx SDK.
- 22. From the command prompt in the External KeyStorage folder run the following command:

```
bootgen -p zcu9eg -arch zynqmp -image ExternalKeyStorage.bif -w -o BOOT.bin
```

- 23. Power off the ZCU102 board.
- 24. Copy **BOOT.bin** to a blank SD card.
- 25. Load the SD card into the J100 SD slot on the ZCU102 development board.
- 26. Connect a USB cable from the USB Serial port J83 on the ZCU102 board to a computer and make note of which COM port was enumerated with the *Silicon Labs Quad CP2108 USB to UART Bridge: Interface 0*.
- 27. Open a terminal program such as PuTTY or Tera Term and connect to the COM port listed above at 115,200 baud. Enable terminal logging and select a file name and location.






Figure 17: ZCU102 SD Boot Mode Switch Setting

- 28. On the ZCU102 development board, set the dip switch SW6 to configure the board for SD boot mode as shown in Figure 17.
- 29. Load the SD card into the J100 SD slot on the ZCU102 development board.
- 30. Power on the ZCU102 board using switch SW1.

In the terminal program, a menu appears as shown in Figure 18.




Figure 18: Main Menu of External Key Storage Demo

- 31. Press **1** to encrypt a user key and to save the encrypted key to the external SD card and follow the prompts, as illustrated in Figure 19.
 - a. Enter a 96-bit IV.
 - b. Enter an 8-bit key ID. Use an ID of 42 for this key.

An ID of 0 is mapped to user eFUSE 0 bit 0, an ID of 1 is mapped to user eFUSE 0 bit 1, ..., an ID of 255 is mapped to user eFUSE 7 bit 31.



- c. Enter a 256-bit AES key.
- d. Enter a file name including a file extension (for example, Key1.key) for the key up to 16 characters long and then press enter when complete.
- 32. After entering the file name, the program displays the unencrypted key blob which consists of the IV, Key's ID, and the key itself. Afterwards, the ID and AES key are encrypted using the PUF's device-unique KEK, the entire 61 byte encrypted key blob is displayed, and the entire encrypted key blob is written to the SD card.
- 33. Repeat the entire encryption process and encrypt another key and IV, using step 31. However, select an ID that is equal to 0xFF and create a unique key file name (e.g., Key2.key).
- 34. Power off the ZCU102 board.
- 35. Remove the SD card and insert the card into a SD card reader on a computer.
- 36. Using a browser or the command line, display the contents of the SD card.
- 37. Make sure both key files generated in step 31 and step 33 appear on the SD card as shown in Figure 20.






Figure 19: External Key Storage Encryption




Figure 20: Directory Contents of the SD Card after Writing the Encrypted Key

38. Open both keys in a hex editor and confirm that they match the encrypted key blobs displayed in the user application. KEY1.KEY is shown in Figure 21 and matches the output generated in Figure 19.





Figure 21: Encrypted Key Data Stored in KEY1.KEY Read from the SD Card

- 39. Remove the SD card from the computer and insert the card into the ZCU102 development board.
- 40. Apply power to the ZCU102 development board.

The menu shown in Figure 18 appears.

- 41. Press 2 to decrypt the data that is stored externally on the SD card.
- 42. Type in the name of the key and the file extension used in step 31 (Key1.key).

The key is read from the SD card and placed into OCM for processing.

The encrypted key blob is displayed.

The decryption process of the key blob takes place and the decrypted information is displayed showing the IV, key ID, and key.

The decrypted GCM tag is compared to the GCM tag stored in the encrypted key blob and the software indicates if they match.

Lastly, the key ID is mapped to and compared to the associated bit stored in the user eFUSEs and the software indicates if the IDs match. In this case, the IDs match. An ID of 0 is mapped to user eFUSE 0 bit 0, an ID of 1 is mapped to user eFUSE 0 bit 1, ..., an ID of 255 is mapped to user eFUSE 7 bit 31.

- 43. Repeat the process and decrypt the second key that was created in step 33.
- 44. All of the same information from step 42 is displayed and the key is decrypted and passes authentication. However, the software simulates ID 255 being revoked and should not be used. When ID 255 is read from a decrypted key file, the software replaces the actual value read in from User eFUSE Seven, 0x0000,0000, with a simulated value of 0x8000,0000. Since bit 31 of User eFUSE Seven is now set and appears to be burned, this simulates ID 255 as being revoked. Refer to Figure 3. Decrypting the two test keys is shown in Figure 22.








Figure 22: External Key Storage Decryption - Decrypting Two Keys and Simulating a Revocation of Key with ID 255

Ordering

Because of the additional screening required to ensure entropy, Xilinx offers two versions of the PUF, a 128-bit and a 256-bit. In both cases, the KEK length is 256 bits. These devices require special ordering codes (SCD). The PUF is not supported for the standard ordering codes, except for development and evaluation, as there is no assurance that there is sufficient entropy in the KEK. Entropy is measured as described in *Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC PUF Characterization Report* (RPT236) [Ref 5] which is a Xilinx proprietary report. Contact your local Xilinx FAE or sales person to obtain a copy of the report. Use of the PUF does not require additional licensing fees.



Conclusion

This application note guides a user on how to use the PUF's device-unique encryption key in conjunction with the AES-GCM hardware in order to encrypt user generated data and store the encrypted data externally. The encrypted data can then be read from external storage and decrypted using the AES-GCM hardware in conjunction with the PUF's device-unique key. In addition, this application note shows how to perform data validation of decrypted data packets by utilizing values stored in the user programmable section of eFUSEs.

Reference Design

Download the reference design files for this application note from the Xilinx website.

Table 1 shows the reference design matrix.

Table 1: Reference Design Checklist

Parameter	Description
General	
Developer Name(s)	Jim Wesselkamper, Nathan Menhorn
Target Devices	Zynq UltraScale+ devices
Source code provided?	Yes
Source code format (if provided)	С
Design uses code or IP from existing reference design, application note, 3rd party or Vivado software? If yes, list.	
Simulation	
Functional simulation performed	No
Timing simulation performed?	No
Testbench provided for functional and timing simulation?	No
Testbench format	N/A
Simulator software and version	N/A
SPICE/IBIS simulations	N/A
Implementation software tool(s) and version	SDK 2018.1
Static timing analysis performed?	No
Hardware Verification	
Hardware verified?	Yes
Platform used for verification	ZCU102 evaluation board



Appendix A

Creating the Zynq UltraScale+ ZCU102 Evaluation Board Hardware Design

- 1. Open Vivado Design Suite.
- 2. In the Quick Start tab click Create Project.
- 3. Click Next in the Create a New Vivado Project page.
- 4. Enter **ZCU102** in the Project name.
- 5. Enter or select an appropriate working directory in the Project location.
- 6. Click **Next** on the **Project Name** page.
- 7. In **Project Type**, select **RTL Project** and uncheck **Do not specify sources at this time**.
- 8. Click **Next** on the **Project Type** page.
- Click Next on the Add Sources page.
- 10. Click **Next** on the **Add Constraints (optional)** page.
- 11. On the Default Part page, click the **Boards** tab.
- 12. Type in **ZCU** in the Search.
- 13. Click the **Zyng UltraScale+ ZCU102 Evalulation Board**.
- 14. Click **Next** on the **Default Part** page.
- 15. Click **Finish** on the **New Project Summary** Page and wait while the project is being created.
- 16. In the Project Manager tab located on the left of the Vivado workspace, click **IP INTEGRATOR** > **Create Block Design**.
- 17. When the **Create Block Design** window appears, type in **ZCU102** in **Design**. Leave everything else set to default.
- 18. Click **OK** and wait while the design is created.
- 19. In the **Diagram** section of the workspace, located on the top right, click the + button to add IP.
- 20. When the Search box appears, type in **ZYNQ**.
- 21. Double-click **Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC** and wait while the part is added to the design.
- 22. Click **Run Block Automation** at the top of the **Diagram** window.
- 23. After the **Run Block Automation** window appears, select **All Automation** and **Apply Board Preset**, click **OK** and wait while the automation takes place.
- 24. Double-click the Zyng UltraScale+ part in the Diagram window.
- 25. Click **Page Navigator > PS-PL Configuration** located on the left of the Zynq UltraScale+ (3.2) window.



- 26. Click **PS-PL Interfaces** located in the PS-PL Configuration window.
- 27. Click Master Interface and uncheck the AXI HPM0 FPD and AXI HPM1 FPD parameters.
- 28. Click **OK** to close the window.
- 29. Pres **F6** to validate the design.
- 30. Click **OK** when the **Validate Design** window opens indicating the validation was successful.
- 31. In the **BLOCK DESIGN** window, click the **Sources** tab in the upper left-hand corner.
- 32. Right-click **ZCU102** and select **Create HDL Wrapper**.
- 33. When the **Create HDL Wrapper** window opens, let Vivado manage wrapper and auto-update, then click **OK** and wait while the design sources is created.
- 34. In the **BLOCK DESIGN** window in the upper left corner on the **Sources** tab, expand the ZCU102_wrapper.
- 35. Right-click **ZCU102_i: ZCU102** and select **Generate Output Products**.
- 36. Leave the default settings in the **Generate Output Products** window. Click **Generate** and wait while the IP is being generated.
- 37. Click **OK** when the **Generate Output Products** window displays **Out-of-context module** run was launched for generating output products.

Exporting the ZCU102 Hardware and Launching Xilinx SDK

- 1. In the main Vivado Design Suite toolbar select **File > Export > Export Hardware**.
- 2. When the **Export Hardware** window opens, leave the **Include bitstream** option unchecked and the <Local to Project> selected in the **Export to** option.
- 3. Click OK.
- 4. In the main Vivado Design Suite toolbar select **File > Launch SDK**.
- 5. When the Launch SDK window opens, leave Exported location set to <Local to Project> and choose a location for where the SDK workspace is created or leave the setting <Local to Project>.
- 6. Xilinx SDK is launched and wait while the hardware gets imported.

After importing the hardware, you should see a project named **ZCU102_wrapper_hw_platform_0** that was automatically created based upon the ZCU102 evaluation board.



Creating the First Stage Boot Loader (FSBL) and Board Support Package (BSP)

- 1. In the main Xilinx SDK toolbar, select File > New > Application Project.
- 2. In the Application Project window, change the following three configuration items:
 - a. Project name: FSBL
 - b. Processor: psu_cortexa53_0
 - c. Board Support Package: Create New: A53 BSP
- 3. Click Next.
- 4. On the Template page of the New Project window, select **Zynq MP FSBL**.
- 5. Click **Finish**.

The workspace is now updated with the FSBL project and the A53_BSP board support package.

6. By default, in Xilinx SDK all the projects are built automatically. You can disable this from the main toolbar by selecting **Project > Build Automatically** to disable this feature.

Validate the Hardware and Software with the Hello World Application

- 1. In the main Xilinx SDK toolbar, select **File > New > Application Project**.
- 2. In the Application Project window change the following three configuration items:
 - a. Project name: HelloWorld
 - b. Processor: psu_cortexa53_0
 - c. Board Support Package: Use Existing: A53_BSP
- 3. Click Next.
- 4. On the **Template** page of the **New Project** window, select **Hello World**.
- 5. Click Finish.
- 6. Right-click the A53_BSP project and click Board Support Package Settings.
- 7. In the **Board Support Package Settings** window expand the **Overview** tree and then click standalone.
- 8. Make sure the stdin and stdout functions are mapped to psu uart 0 and click OK.
- 9. Right-click the HelloWorld project and select **Build Project**.
- 10. Connect either the USB JTAG connector J2 to the ZCU102 development board and then to a computer or connect the Platform JTAG to the ZCU102 via J8 and the associated hardware to a computer.



- 11. Connect a USB cable from the USB Serial port connector J83 on the ZCU102 board to a computer and make note of which COM port was enumerated with the *Silicon Labs Quad CP2108 USB to UART Bridge: Interface 0*.
- 12. Open a terminal program such as PuTTY or Tera Term and connect to the COM port listed above at 115,200 baud.
- 13. On the ZCU102 development board set the dip switch to configure the board for JTAG boot mode as shown in Figure 6.
- 14. Right-click the HelloWorld project and select Run As > Launch on Hardware (System Debugger).
- 15. Verify that "Hello World" is output on the terminal screen. The hardware and software is properly configured and is now ready for use.

Documentation Navigator and Design Hubs

Xilinx Documentation Navigator provides access to Xilinx documents, videos, and support resources, which you can filter and search to find information. To open the Xilinx Documentation Navigator (DocNav):

- From the Vivado IDE, select Help > Documentation and Tutorials.
- On Windows, select Start > All Programs > Xilinx Design Tools > DocNav.
- At the Linux command prompt, enter docnav.

Xilinx Design Hubs provide links to documentation organized by design tasks and other topics, which you can use to learn key concepts and address frequently asked questions. To access the Design Hubs:

- In the Xilinx Documentation Navigator, click the Design Hubs View tab.
- On the Xilinx website, see the Design Hubs page.

Note: For more information on Documentation Navigator, see the Documentation Navigator page on the Xilinx website.

References

- 1. Zyng UltraScale+ MPSoC Device: Technical Reference Manual (UG1085)
- 2. Programming BBRAM and eFUSEs (XAPP1319)
- 3. Developing Tamper-Resistant Designs with Zyng UltraScale+ Devices (XAPP1323)
- 4. Zyng UltraScale+ MPSoC: Embedded Design Tutorial (UG1209)
- 5. Zynq UltraScale+ MPSoC PUF Characterization Report (RPT236)



Revision History

The following table shows the revision history for this document.

Section	Revision Summary
05/28/2021 Version 1.1	
Introduction	Added a note for further clarity about boot header permissibility
	Added a note about the PUF Key
06/26/2018 Version 1.0	
Initial Xilinx release.	N/A

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